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SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS
The Pressure Systems Manager at NASA Ames Research
Center (ARC) has embarked on a project to collect data and
develop risk assessment models to support risk-informed
decision making regarding future inspections of underground
pipes at ARC.
This paper shows progress in one area of this project — a
corrosion risk assessment model for the underground high-
pressure air distribution piping system at ARC. It consists of a
Corrosion Model of pipe-segments, a Pipe Wrap Protection
Model; and a Pipe Stress Model for a pipe segment. A Monte
Carlo simulation of the combined models provides a
distribution of the failure probabilities. Sensitivity study
results show that the model uncertainty, or lack of knowledge,
is the dominant contributor to the calculated unreliability of
the underground piping system. As a result, the Pressure
Systems Manager may consider investing resources
specifically focused on reducing these uncertainties.
Future work includes completing the data collection effort
for the existing ground based pressure systems and applying
the risk models to risk-based inspection strategies of the
underground pipes at ARC.
1 INTRODUCTION
There is about a mile and a half of underground piping at
ARC for the 3000 psig high-pressure air distribution system.
The underground carbon steel pipes at ARC generally are
not directly exposed to the soil. They have either one or two
layers of a protective pipe wrap. In addition, sand is back-
filled into the trench so that the wrapped underground pipes do
not directly see dirt.
For unprotected pipe, its structural integrity is affected by
corrosion. The corrosion rate is dependent on pipe material
type and chemical properties of the surrounding soil. At ARC,
the high-pressure air flowing through the pipe is dry and hence
does not corrode the pipe walls. Instead, the corrosion is
external — corrosive soils create pits on the outside surface of
the pipe resulting in a reduction in pipe wall thickness from
the outside.
Unwrapped or poorly wrapped pipes had failed in five to
ten years. These were replaced with wrapped pipes that have
been underground for about 20 years. Older piping is
intuitively more at risk than newer piping. At ARC, much of
the piping is significantly over-designed which provides
excess margin against corrosion, but not forever. In some of
the older piping, the quantities and bills of material are not
currently quantified and the quality of corrosion protection is
also unknown. The underground piping is generally not
inspected because it cannot be inspected without excavation.
Failure of any underground pressurized pipe is a potentially
significant hazard to personnel and critical facilities.
The objective of this paper is a bottoms-up development
of an underground air distribution piping corrosion risk
assessment model that can be used to develop future risk-
based inspection strategies at ARC.
2 OVERVIEW OF THE MODEL
Figure 1 shows the overall underground piping risk model
developed as a generic model that can be applied at different
locations. It includes:
• Corrosion Model of the pipe-segment if it were exposed
(i.e., without pipe wrap) to the local environmental
conditions.
• Pipe Wrap Protection Model that models the protective
factor of the pipe wrap;
• Mission Operations Model that describes the operating
condition profile over a period of an average year;
• Pipe Stress Model that analyzes the pipe stress at a pipe
segment and calculates the factor of safety over the pipe
segment;
In Figure 1, these four models are represented by blue
rectangles. All four of these models are described in more
detail in following sections as applicable at ARC.
A failed pipe wrap and resulting corrosion leads to a
change in the underground pipe wall state. This is shown in
Figure 1 as a yellow circle, indicating that this state is not
known very well. The pipe wall state is a major input into the
pipe stress model. Another input is the pipe type and the
location — this is potentially well known and hence, indicated
by a green parallelogram. A major part of the project at ARC
is collecting and organizing this data to enable the model
analyses.
The four models, in general, can be run sequentially to
obtain a factor of safety. In this paper, because of the specific
conditions at ARC, they are combined into a single model that
provides the factor of safety as an output.
A Monte Carlo simulation is performed over all four
models (or, a combined model) with various input parameters
from their statistical distributions to assess failure probability
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distribution of the piping system. Failure consequence in this
model is a function of the pipe location relative to where a
pipe break could cause damage. The risk model is a standalone
calculation of the failure probability with the failure
consequence.
The pipe wrap history is also part of the data collection.
The failure modes in the pipe wrap model are incompletely
understood, and the history data being gathered will help
improve our understanding in the future.
Historical failures and operations of underground piping
are available from industry and are also being collected in a
more useful form at ARC. Up until this point in time, no
preventive maintenance related data has been collected at
ARC regarding the underground pipes. It is expected that in
the future, the Pressure Safety Manager will identify
(hopefully, using this or another risk model) underground
piping inspection locations as a function of the pipe wrap
history, pipe type, location, failure risk, and other relevant
data.
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Figure 1: Underground Piping Risk Model.
The inspection data will yield observations of fault and
no-fault areas of underground piping. This data is expected in
the future and is indicated in yellow to show that it is currently
unknown. The historical failure data and the inspection results
can be used in this modeling approach to update the
parameters of the corrosion and pipe wrap models. Future data
may also enable an update of the pipe wrap model, not just its
parameters.
The overall model shows the complete feedback loop of
data and model as a part of the proposed risk assessment
strategy.
This proposed model does not pertain to failures caused
by design, fabrication, or manufacturing defects.
3 CORROSION MODEL
protective pipe wrap. However, if the pipe wrap fails and the
pipes were directly exposed to the soil environment, they will
corrode at some rate by complex electrochemical processes.
Numerous factors influence corrosion in soil including soil
type, moisture content, position of the water table, soil
resistivity, soluble ion content, soil pH, oxidation-reduction
(redox) potential and rates of microbes in soil corrosion [1].
The high pressure air is dried to a level of -80° F dew
point before it enters the ARC high pressure piping system, so
internal corrosion is not considered a relevant failure
mechanism.
A number of models have been proposed in the literature
for the corrosion rate [2-6]. This paper uses a two-parameter
model originally proposed by Romanoff based on an extensive
data collection by the National Bureau of Standards [2]:
Underground pipes at ARC are generally not directly
n
exposed to the soil and have either one or two layers of a
	
w = kT 	 (1)
where, w is the loss of wall thickness (in) or deepest pit at
time T, k is a multiplying constant, T is the exposure time
(years), and n is the exponential constant. This model is an
empirical one that fits the data rather than one obtained from
“corrosion science.”
The prior distribution of the parameters k and n are taken
from other studies using non-ARC data [7, 8]. Corrosion
model parameter k is assumed lognormal with mean 0.015 and
standard deviation 0.037, and parameter n is lognormal with
mean 1.0 and standard deviation 0.14, respectively.
The parameters k and n may be dependent on the location
(e.g., ARC versus elsewhere in the country) and the pipe
material. For this paper with limited data from ARC, a
compact model is chosen with a single parameter k and a
single parameter n that are assumed to be applicable. This is
the a priori model. With additional data, it may be necessary to
expand the parameter space. With limited failure data, it is not
currently conceived that the model will change, but with
enough NASA and industry data, even model change is
possible.
4 PIPE WRAP PROTECTION MODEL
The ARC underground pipe wrap is specified in the
construction specifications. There is uncertainty whether the
specifications has been consistent over the years. Mostly, the
pipe tape wrap system is composed of a bare steel primer, an
inner wrap of polyethylene tape with adhesive, and a
protective outer wrap of polyethylene tape with adhesive
stabilized or color coded for ultraviolet protection. The field
fitting and joint wrap system is composed of a double wrap of
highly conformable polyethylene tape with adhesive for
fittings, and heat shrunk radiation cross-linked polyolefin
sleeve with mastic sealant for weld joints. The field irregular
surface mastic coating system is composed of coal tar mastic
coating applied by brush over bare steel.
A number of pipe wrap and coating failure modes have
been described in the literature [9-12]. However, our literature
search did not reveal any model that would capture the pipe
wrap defects/failure. Instead, this paper uses the results
obtained by Ductile Iron Pipe Research Association (DIPRA)
[8] to derive a model that fits the needs of the study. DIPRA
tests showed a reduction in the pitting rate for polyethylene
encased pipes. These tests were performed in corrosive soils
and used a measurement criterion based on the single deepest
pit in the pipe surface. The results of these tests specifically
showed a reduction in pitting rate by a factor of 33.
This paper assumes that a protective factor model would
describe the reduction in pitting rate due to pipe wrap. The
model is:
fij = Si + (1-S i)(R jTy)
	
(2)
where, S i = 0 or 1. Subscript i indicates the installation project
team; subscript j indicates a section of the underground pipe;
fij is the protective factor of the pipe wrap at (i,j); S i is 1 if the
pipe length was not wrapped before being buried and 0 is the
piping was wrapped. If the pipe was not wrapped then that
section of the pipe has a protective factor of 1. Otherwise, the
protective factor model, R j Ty, shown in the second half the
equation applies. The model assumes, as is the case at ARC,
that all buried wrapped pipe were Holiday tested to be defect
free. The protection factor includes a scale parameter Rj
 
that
reflects the growth rate of additional coating defects with time,
and y is the exponent for the growth rate over time.
Data collection efforts regarding the installer project
team, including contractor and NASA project management,
will help quantify S i. Documentation showing proof that the
pipe was wrapped will make it 0, while if the documentation is
not conclusive then it will be 1 (i.e., unwrapped) with some
probability p.
The parameter R has the subscript j that indicates whether
the section of the pipe was regular double wrapped, a section
where it was difficult to double wrap, or a section that had
irregular surface resulting in a different type of coating
protection. These three different sections are expected to see
different protection factors.
The prior distribution of p is assumed to be uniform (0,1)
team — it is equally likely to be any probability between 0
and 1. The prior distribution of Rj is assumed to be lognormal
with mean 0.03 and standard deviation 0.03 and y is assumed
to be Uniform (0.9, 1.1) based on [8, 7].
5 MISSION OPERATIONS MODEL
The mission operations profile for underground piping
consists of the internal pressure, temperature and moisture
content of the pressure system. The variations in the external
conditions are part of the corrosion model. The maximum
operating conditions are well known and cyclic usage is low at
ARC. Hence, all known underground pipe sections will have
large theoretical fatigue life and so the pressure, temperature
usage profiles are considered to be not relevant in determining
failure history. The air in the piping systems has very low
humidity and so the moisture content history is also
considered not relevant to failure history or failure prediction.
The pressure seen in any pipe section is typically a saw-
tooth profile during the periods of operation. Separate
assessments indicate that fatigue is not a limiting factor for
underground pipe life expectancy. So, the pressure model in
this study assumes that any pipe section sees either zero
pressure when it is not in operation or a constant maximum
pressure, which is 3000 psig. For failure prediction, the
pressure model is Pj for each section j of the underground
pipe. The temperature and moisture content is not part of the
pipe stress model (see next section).
6 PIPE STRESS MODEL
Underground pipe loads fall into two main categories:
external (traffic load, earth load, frost load, expansive soil
load, and temperature induced expansion/contraction load) and
internal (working pressure, surge pressure, and thermally
induced pressure change) [14]. The working internal pressure
load is at least an order of magnitude larger than the other
loads for underground pipes at ARC. Hence, the focus of this
study is on these internal loads.
Pipe stress analysis is performed at ARC on Caesar II,
which is a commercial, off-the-shelf software and an industry
standard. The pipe stress code is normally ASME B31.3. For
nominal design for sustained loads (e.g., weight, pressure),
there is a 3:1 Factor of Safety on ultimate strength for wall
thickness. Stress due to occasional loads (e.g., seismic) and
stress due to thermal displacement ranges have less total
Factor of Safety, but are generally not relevant to this
underground piping at ARC.
The most sensitive elements for pipe stress for ARC
systems are:
• Regions with high stress intensification factors
(SIFs), such as Branch Connections, can have SIFs
ranging from 1.1 to 10. Castings and welds can also
have SIFs greater than 1, but these are not part of the
High-Pressure Air Distribution System design.
• End connections to equipment that typically have
very low nozzle load limits.
• In-line equipment such as valves which have welded
or mechanical joints.
• Welded attachments for pipe supports and other non-
pressurized appurtenances (e.g., thermowells), that
concentrate pressure and reaction stress, as well have
material discontinuity effects (e.g., due to lugs) that
can lead to cracking.
With knowledge gained from the high-fidelity models of the
High-Pressure Air Distribution System, it became apparent
that a simpler stress model could be utilized for underground
piping. The underground piping is continuously supported by
the soil, is essentially at constant temperature, does not have
in-line equipment, nor does it have end connections
underground. So, stress intensification only occurs at branch
connections.
The pipe stress (σj,l) at section j, location l is then a
combination of the hoop stress and the SIF. For thin wall
straight pipe under internal pressure, neglecting manufacturing
tolerances and allowances:
σj,l = I lPj dj/2tj 	 (3)
where, I l is the stress intensification factor at location l; P j , dj ,
and tj are the internal pressure (when pressurized), inside pipe
diameter, and pipe wall thickness at section j, respectively.
7 FACTOR OF SAFETY AND MONTE CARLO MODEL
as aleatory and epistemic. The aleatory uncertainty is the
uncertainty intrinsic in the physical parameters. The epistemic
uncertainty relates to the model uncertainty (lack of
knowledge). Sensitivity study results show that the epistemic
uncertainty is the dominant contributor to the calculated
unreliability of the underground piping system.
8 FUTURE WORK
Currently, sensitivity analyses have been performed using
this model for a number of candidate locations of the
underground piping system at ARC. This is part of a larger
project that includes a data collection effort and eventually
applying the results of the risk assessment for risk-based
inspection strategies of the underground pipes.
Data Collection:
A simultaneous, data collection effort is taking place for
existing ground based pressure systems. This data will support
the risk modeling and analytical effort. It is a labor intensive
activity since the data is being obtained from heterogeneous
sources that needs fact checking. This data will be put in the
Pressure Systems database for subsequent analyses.
Failure Consequence:
This paper does not address failure consequence and risk.
This is an area for future activity as the data collection effort is
completed. Current thought is that the failure consequence
would be a function of the pipe location relative to where a
pipe break could cause damage. So a failure analysis of the
underground pipe section j at its geographic location needs to
be performed to determine the failure consequence.
Risk-Based Inspection:
The ultimate goal of the project is to provide a framework
for risk-informed decision making regarding future
inspections of underground pipes at ARC, and ultimately
throughout NASA. If the data supported it, there could be cost
savings from less frequent inspections and system life
extension or designing meaningful mitigation strategies for
different failure modes.
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